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I. INTRODUCTION
During the past year, the courts of Florida have dealt with almost
all aspects of the law of trusts and succession, including interpretation
of both case law and statutes. Moreover, the legislature has made sig-
nificant changes in the statutes.
The purpose of this survey is to give the practitioner an overview of
the area, beginning with legislation, followed by trusts and concluding
with succession.
II. LEGISLATION
An attempt by the Legislature to clarify the law of trusts in Florida
is found in section 689.075 of the 1969 Florida Statutes which lists powers
that may be retained by the settlor of an inter vivos trust, either singly
* This survey includes all reported cases from September, 1965, through August, 1969,
and the legislation enacted by the 1969 First Regular Session of the Florida Legislature.
** Associate Editor, University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor, Freshman
Research and Writing.
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or jointly, without affecting its nontestamentary character.' This amend-
ment specifically mandates that when the settlor at any time becomes
the sole trustee of the trust, the trust instrument shall be executed in
accordance with the Statute of Wills. This would appear to make Totten
Trusts void. Also worthy of note is the permissive power of the settlor
to control the trustee or trustees in the administration of the trust.2
Section 660.12 of the Florida Statutes, which concerns the common
trust fund investments of banks and trust companies, was significantly
changed in 1967. The directive that no investments of a common trust
fund shall be made in mortgages was deleted, impliedly sanctioning such
investments if they comply with the other requirements of that section,
i.e., a proper investment for each fiduciary account owning an interest
in the common trust fund.
3
In the area of succession, the legislature recently amended section
731.23 of the Florida Statutes,4 which concerns the order of succession
in case of intestacy, to authorize a parent, with or without consideration,
to disclaim, renounce, or refuse to accept an inheritance of property from
any of his children by a written instrument. In such a case the disclaiming
parent is deemed to have predeceased such child.
The statute on the form and manner of filing claims against an estate
now makes a special distinction as to claims secured by insurance by
including the proviso that failure to file a claim bars all rights except to
the extent of the insurance.5 Previously, heirs, legatees, or devisees were
excused from filing any claims against the estate." Since 1967, however,
such persons must file claims for specific items, such as debts.7
The right of a widow to have a jury determine her right to dower has
been modified.' Written demand for a jury must be made one week before
trial, in contrast to the previous time limit of twenty-four hours. The
requirement that the party demanding the jury also deposit costs in ad-
vance in connection therewith has been eliminated.
The procedure for granting an extension of time to the widow, faced
with the alternative of electing dower, was broadened to include litigation
of any matter affecting such estate wherein the full and complete extent
of estate assets subject to dower are in doubt.9
1. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-192, at 436.
2. But see Lane v. Palmer First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 213 So.2d 301 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1968) discussed infra at p. 282.
3. Compare FLA. STAT. § 660.12 (1967) with FLA. STAT. § 660.12 (1965).
4. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-173, at 415.
5. FLA. STAT. § 733.16(I)(d) (1967).
6. FLA. STAT. § 733.16(2) (1965).
7. FLA. STAT. § 733.16(2) (1967).
8. Compare FLA. STAT. § 733.12(3) (1967) with FLA. STAT. § 733.12(3) (1965).
9. FLA. STAT. § 731.35(2) (1967). See also First Nat'l Bank v. McFarland, 200 So.2d 244
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
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III. TRUSTS
A. Express Trusts
1. INTER VIVOS CREATION
The surviving spouse of the deceased wife sought to impress a trust
upon all of the real and personal property which the wife possessed at the
time of her death based on an alleged oral understanding that any and
all possessions, real, personal, mixed, or otherwise, which the parties
accumulated either by their sole or joint efforts, were to be held and
owned for the mutual advantage of both parties. The third district, affirm-
ing the lower court, found that the factual allegations were not sufficient
to support a finding of the existence of a trust.10
In Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Gains Construction Co.," the third
district again denied the existence of a trust. The court decided that
where customers paid money to a utility company to secure service in
return for the utility company's promise to repay the unused portion of
the deposit, a debt was created. The basis of the decision was that the
utility company was given absolute control over the deposit; hence, no
trust relationship was created.
Presented with a complex business situation in which a seller of a ship
agreed to lend money to the buyers in consideration of the purchase of
the ship and a stock interest, to be held in trust by the buyers for the
seller's son, the third district concluded that even though the loan was
never made, the sons were entitled to beneficial ownership of the stock,
even as to subsequent purchasers. The subsequent purchasers were not
entitled to the defense that they were unaware of the beneficial interest
of the sons, even though the trust stock was issued to bearer. Thus, the
trust was enforced in accordance with the original agreement.12
The validity of an inter vivos trust, in which the settlor retained the
power to revoke, modify, and invade the corpus, the power to direct the
disposition of the corpus and the use of the income for life, was put in
issue in Lane v. Palmer First National Bank & Trust Co.3 The court held
that an inter vivos trust is valid, even though it contains a power to control
the trustee, if there is no actual evidence of day-to-day control by the
settlor. In the event that day-to-day control is exercised by the settlor,
an agency is created instead of a trust. 4
A deed of trust executed by a 76-year-old man, suffering from arterio-
sclerosis and senile brain disease, which caused erratic behavior, was
found to be void due to incompetency and undue influence. The donee,
who was the vicar of the donor's church and who occupied a confidential
10. Feller v. Kline, 213 So.2d 300 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
11. 199 So.2d 482 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
12. Fraser v. Lewis, 187 So.2d 684 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
13. 213 So.2d 301 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
14. But see Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-192, at 436, discussed p. 281 suPra.
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relationship to him, failed to meet the burden of proof that no undue
influence was exercised in the procurement of the trust deed. 5
In Watkins v. First National Bank,' the second district determined
that the intent of the donor of an irrevocable trust, created for the benefit
of the donor's minor sons who were living with his divorced wife, was
critical to its construction. The trustee sought clarification of the trust
language which provided that the trustee should accumulate the income
which was not needed for the sons' benefit because the mother of the
beneficiaries refused to make an accounting of the trust disbursements.
The requirements of revocation of a revocable trust by will or writing
attested to by two witnesses were discussed in MacFarlane v. First Na-
tional Bank.' The settlor executed a revocation of the trust which was
never delivered due to the neglect of a third party. The trustee continued
to send the settlor monthly statements and other correspondence con-
cerning the trust. The court decided that since the trust could be revoked
by will, it seemed logical that delivery was not essential for its termination.
The court further explained that the settlor's continued recognition of
the trust after its revocation did not vitiate his revocation in light of the
positive instructions to the third party to mail the instrument.
2. TESTAMENTARY CREATION
Three cases reached the third district concerning the funding of testa-
mentary trusts. The first, In re Estate of Cohen,'8 involved the provisions
of a marital deduction trust. The court relied upon the canons and rules
of testamentary construction to establish the testator's intention. The
second case, In re Estate of Horner," concerned a residuary trust which
was to come into being after the debts, taxes, and expenses of adminis-
tration of the estate were paid. Before these items were settled, the bene-
ficiary died. The court concluded that the beneficiary's estate was not
entitled to the earnings of the trust during the time that the beneficiary
survived the settlor because the residuary trust never came into being;
and, therefore, no net income was generated. The third case, Risolia v.
First National Bank,20 differed from the second in one respect. The settlor
created a trust to his widow for life in addition to a residuary trust. The
court found that the right of the widow as the beneficiary of the first
trust to receive the interest therefrom vested immediately. Hence, any
income from the trust assets commenced to accrue upon the settlor's
death, although the specific assets were not determined until later.
The Rule Against Perpetuities was discussed at length in In re Estate
15. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co. v. Brooks, 200 So.2d 251 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1967).
16. 183 So.2d 575 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
17. 203 So.2d 57 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
18. 196 So.2d 447 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
19. 207 So.2d 730 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
20. 224 So.2d 714 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
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of McCune."' The will and codicil provided for a trust, the income of
which was to be paid to the decedent's sister and to eleven other male
beneficiaries. The codicil further provided that should any of the male
beneficiaries predecease either the testator or his sister, his widow would
receive his share of the income. The trust was to continue until the death
of the last surviving beneficiary, whether it was one of the named in-
dividuals or a widow of one of the males. Upon the death of the last sur-
viving beneficiary, the entire corpus was to be transferred to another
trust. The trial court's finding that the rights of the widows of the male
beneficiaries were invalid as an indefinite class gift which was violative
of the Rule Against Perpetuities was reversed by the appellate court.
The appellate court explained that the interest of each widow is indepen-
dent of that of the others and therefore is not a class gift but rather a
contingent interest. The designation of widows is sufficiently precise so
that upon the death of the named males his widow can easily be deter-
mined. At the time of the testator's death all of the male beneficiaries
were lives in being. Thus; the contingent interests of the wives would
vest, if at all, at the death of their husbands.
Another aspect of the Rule Against Perpetuities was considered in
Brown v. Saake.22 The subject will created a trust wherein twenty-five
per cent of the trust income was to be accumulated, while the other
seventy-five per cent was to be distributed to specific religious organiza-
tions. The Second District Court of Appeal ruled that a gift of a public,
permanent interest may be established as a trust and must vest, as must
a private trust, within a life or lives in being and twenty-one years, plus
the period of gestation. Furthermore, a gift for a charitable purpose may
be perpetual in its duration and not be within the Rule Against Per-
petuities. "If the bequest is a vested interest, a provision for accumulation
of the income is valid and will be effectuated so long as it is not un-
reasonable. '28
In a per curiam decision, the Third District Court of Appeal an-
nounced that a person named in a trust created by will as a remainderman
has standing to maintain an action for removal of trustees because he
occupies the status of a beneficiary. 4
B. Resulting Trusts
1. ARISING FROM FAMILY RELATIONSHrPS
Prior to moving to Florida, the decedent and his widow had purchased
personal property in the husband's name in a community property juris-
diction. The third district found a resulting trust in favor of the widow,
explaining that "[u]nder Florida law, if a portion of the consideration
21. 214 So.2d 56 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
22. 190 So.2d 56 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
23. Id. at 59.
24. Railey v. Skzggs, 220 So.2d 689 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
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belongs to the wife and title is taken in the husband's name alone, a re-
sulting trust arises in her favor by implication of law to the extent that
consideration furnished by her is used .... Therefore, while the husband
held legal title to the note and contract, he held a one-half interest in
trust for his wife.")25
An unsuccessful attempt to establish a resulting trust was presented
in Mordue v. Case,26 a divorce action. The wife sought to have properties
which the husband had transferred to his sister and two daughters prior
to the marriage sequestered. The wife proved that the husband continued
to manage the property and to enjoy the profits therefrom. The court,
however, said that "[i]n the creation of a resulting trust it is essential
that the parties actually intend to create the trust relationship but fail
to execute documents or establish adequate evidence of intent.12 7 The
court further observed that "[t]he law favors a presumption that such
gifts are voluntary, and the record does not disclose to the contrary.12 8
The use of the property was a return gift which did not affect title.
In another unsuccessful attempt to have a resulting trust declared,
the third district stated, "where property is purchased by the husband
and conveyed to the wife, a presumption arises from their relationship
at the time the conveyance was made that no trust was intended. The
courts will presume that the wife takes the beneficial title as well as legal
title, and that by placing title in her name, the husband intended a gift.1"2
In Cook v. Katiba,30 the imposition of a purchase-money resulting
trust in a parcel of land was upheld on a theory of estoppel. In addition,
a resulting trust once established may be released by implied gift."
2. ARISING FROM BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS
Purchase-money resulting trusts may also be impressed as a result
of a repurchase agreement relating to realty.
A resulting trust arises when the legal estate in property is
disposed of, conveyed or transferred, but the intent appears
or is inferred from the terms of the disposition, or from accom-
panying facts and circumstances, that the beneficial interest
is not to go to or be enjoyed with the legal title. In such a case
a trust is implied or results in favor of the person whom equity
deems to be the real owner.3 2
In such a case, however, the proponent of the resulting trust must over-
come the presumption of correctness of deeds.33
25. Quintana v. Ordono, 195 So.2d 577, 580 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
26. 201 So.2d 844 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
27. Id. at 845.
28. Id. at 846.
29. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brax, 182 So.2d 491, 495 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
30. 190 So.2d 309 (Fla. 1966).
31. Lamb v. Jones, 202 So.2d 810 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
32. Howell v. Fiore, 210 So.2d 253, 255 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
33. Id.
19701
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C. Constructive Trusts
1. ARISING OUT OF FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
In Staples v. Battisti, the court upheld a complaint which sought
to establish a constructive trust to prevent unjust enrichment, arising
out of an alleged abuse of a confidential attorney-client relationship.3 L
The Second District Court of Appeal, in refusing to impress a con-
structive trust, indicated that it favored the presumption that a gift from
parent to child is voluntary and that such a relationship is not so con-
fidential as to create the presumption of fraud. Moreover, the court
reasoned that the exclusion of some offspring from a parent's will does
not raise a presumption of incompetency of the benefactor, nor fraud by
the beneficiaryY5
2. ARISING OUT OF BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS
The courts are in agreement that "[i]n order to have a constructive
trust, the party seeking it must convince the court by clear proof that
refusal to impose such a trust will amount to a fraud."36 In addition,
although clear and convincing proof is presented, the claim to enforce a
constructive trust may be barred by the doctrine of laches 3
A constructive trust may be impressed in a variety of business set-
tings; for example, it may be declared on the proceeds realized by a
real estate broker for secret profits gained from a sale to his principal. 8
Furthermore, the interest of a purchaser under a contract for sale of
realty may be made the subject of a trust when the land is taken by
eminent domain before the sale is consummated.3 9 The constructive
trustee, however, is entitled to be reimbursed for his services, expenses,
and attorney fees expended in connection with the trust property.40
D. Powers and Duties of the Trustee
1. BANKS AS TRUSTEES
When funds are deposited in accounts designated trustee accounts,
the bank has a duty of inquiry as to the authority of the persons desig-
nated trustees to pledge such funds as collateral for a loan. The Florida
Supreme Court held that the descriptive word "trustee" following a de-
positor's name constitutes notice to the bank that the monies deposited in
the account cannot be set off against the depositor's personal debts. 41
34. 191 So.2d 583 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
35. Roberts v. Bryant, 201 So.2d 811 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
36. Price v. Rome, 222 So.2d 252, 253 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969). Accord, Carberry v. Foley,
213 So.2d 635 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
37. Friend v. Kapchuk, 216 So.2d 783 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
38. Gammage v. Turner, 206 So.2d 252 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
39. Arko Enterprises, Inc. v. Wood, 185 So.2d 734 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
40. Hartig v. Leone, 189 So.2d 485 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
41. Homes Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Emile, 216 So.2d 443 (Fla. 1968), aff'g Emile v.
Bright, 203 So.2d 328 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
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In another instance of a bank overreaching its fiduciary duties, the
fourth district stated,
[w]hen a bank receives money to be applied to a particular
purpose and it fails to properly apply it, such bank becomes
a trustee and is answerable to the owner of the money as for a
breach of trust.... Under such circumstances title to the deposit
remains in the depositor, and the relation of debtor and creditor
does not exist.4 2
The power of a bank to act as trustee was put in issue in Florida
Northside Bank v. Lowni Corp.4 3 The defendant bank had released forty-
seven automobiles without payment violating an oral trust to take pos-
session of transferable indicia of title upon receipt of payment for each
car. The bank denied liability on the basis that it had no authority under
law44 to act as trustee. The court found for the plaintiff automobile
importer on the grounds that the bank had failed to prove it was without
authority to perform such duties."'
2. OTHERS AS TRUSTEES
An example of a judgment creditor's attempt to levy on stock cer-
tificates owned by the debtor's children with the debtor as trustee was
presented in Harvest v. Craft Construction Corporation.6 The court de-
clined to merge the beneficial and legal estates and found that insufficient
evidence was presented by the creditor to prove that the money used
to purchase the stock was furnished by the debtor, even though the debtor
remained primarily liable on notes also given for the stock.
The problem of whether capital-gain dividends received by a tes-
tamentary trust from investments in mutual funds were attributable to
principal or income was settled in the case of In re Trust under Jenkins'
Will.47 The will provided that the determination of the income and prin-
cipal by the trustees should be in accordance with the income and principal
statute in the State of Florida. The law at the time of the will's execution
48
was substantially different than that when the capital-gain dividends
were received by the trust. At the latter time, Florida Statutes section
690.06(1) provided that all distributions of capital of mutual investment
trusts shall be deemed principal irrespective of the choice made by the
trustee. The first district ruled that although the income beneficiary has
42. Bank of West Orange v. Associates Discount Corp., 197 So.2d 858, 862 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1967).
43. 213 So.2d 729 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1968).
44. FLA. STAT. § 660.10 (1967).
45. It is submitted that the court should have based its opinion on estoppel since the
officers of the bank frankly admitted they had never obtained trust powers, although they
had widely advertised their possession of such powers.
46. 187 So.2d 72 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
47. 224 So.2d 345 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
48. FLA. STAT. § 690.06(1) (1937) provided that the dividends in shares of the dis-
tributing corporation would be deemed principal, and all dividends payable otherwise would
be deemed income.
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a vested right in income, he has no right, vested or otherwise, in the
formula or rule by which income is determined and that a capital-gain
dividend is in fact a capital distribution rather than income. The rationale
of this ruling was that if the trustees had invested directly in the securities,
instead of through a mutual fund, the same result would have obtained.
Discussing the liability of the trustee for expenses incurred in con-
nection with the conservation of the trust corpus, the third district in
Vazquez v. Goodrich49 decided that a trustee is entitled to legal expenses
incurred in good faith defense of the trust property, but not expenses,
legal or otherwise, incurred in defiance of the trust relationship. In addi--
tion, " [i] f the trustee fails to keep clear, distinct and accurate accounts,
all presumptions are against him and all obscurities and doubts are to be
taken adversely to him."
50
In an action by the trustee to recover compensation from the benefi-
ciary for services rendered in the preservation of the trust, the court found
that there was no individual responsibility on the part of the beneficiary
for such services." The trustee accepted his fiduciary responsibilities in
return for the set salary afforded him from the profits of the trust. The
trustee, therefore, has no claim against the beneficiary but only against
the trust assets.
IV. SUCCESSION
A. Formal Requisites
1. ATTESTATION AND SIGNING
Under Florida Statutes section 731.07 a testator may execute his
will by making his mark instead of writing his alphabetical name.52 The
greatest protection against fraud, according to the Florida Supreme Court,
is furnished by the requirement that the will be signed in the presence of,
or acknowledged in the presence of, at least two attesting witnesses.
5 3
2. NUNCUPATIVE AND HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS
In order to impliedly revoke a prior will, a subsequent will must
be executed according to Florida Statutes section 731.12. The issue of
whether a nuncupative will may revoke a prior written will was resolved
in In re Estate of Carlton.4 The court reached the conclusion that the
legislative intent of the above statute was that in order to constitute an
effective revocation, the subsequent will must be in writing.
The constitutionality of Florida Statutes section 731.07, which re-
49. 206 So.2d 54 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
50. Id. at 55.
51. Lamb v. Jones, 202 So.2d 810 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
52. In re Estate of Williams, 182 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1965).
53. Id.
54. 221 So.2d 184 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
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quires every will to be witnessed, was upheld by the Florida Supreme
Court.5" Further, this statute properly applies to an unwitnessed holo-
graphic will because the intent of the statute is to assure authenticity and
to avoid fraud and imposition.
3. COMPETENCY
The Florida Supreme Court clarified the burden of proof of testa-
mentary capacity in In re Estate of Ziy.5 6 It explained that, after an ad-
judication of incompetency the burden of going forward with evidence as
to testamentary capacity shifts to the will's proponent. While the burden
of proof on the opponent never shifts, the burden of going forward with
evidence (sometimes mistakenly designated burden of proof) does. This
standard is more important than the terminology used.
The principles mentioned above were applied in In re Estate of
Perez,57 where the court held that the testator had the requisite testamen-
tary capacity, despite the fact that he was physically frail and for long
periods did not know what was going on around him. The court added
that "the will appears to have been made under fair circumstances and
was not unnatural in the disposition of the property.""8
The district courts of appeal recognize that the county courts are in
the best position to determine competency. It is, therefore, difficult to ob-
tain a reversal of the county court's finding in this regard, absent a clear
showing that the county judge misapprehended the legal effect of the
evidence. 9
In one instance, however, the county judge took judicial notice of
separate records on file in his court pertaining to a competency proceed-
ing. The first district held that it was error to resort to judicial knowledge
to raise controversies not presented by the record.10
The question of whether the use of narcotics deprived a testator of
the requisite mental capacity to execute a will was raised in In re Estate
of Cole,"' where the testator had been given an injection two hours before
the signing of the will to reduce pain from terminal cancer. The court con-
cluded that, although a testator's use of drugs does not render him at all
times incapable of possession of testamentary capacity, if at the time of
the will's execution the testator does not understand the nature and extent
of the property to be disposed of, his relation to those who would natur-
55. In re Estate of Olson, 181 So.2d 642 (Fla. 1966).
56. 223 So.2d 42 (Fla. 1969).
57. 206 So.2d 58 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
58. Id. at 59.
59. See Miami Bay Oaks Soroptimist Home for the Aged, Inc. v. Smith, 224 So.2d 444
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1969) ; In re Estate of Judy, 220 So.2d 651 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969) ; In re Estate
of Balch, 215 So.2d 343 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968) ; In re Estate of Edmunds, 214 So.2d 65 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1968) ; In re Estate of Burkhart, 204 So.2d 737 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967) ; In re Estate
of Sulin, 204 So.2d 28 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
60. In re Estate of Simpkins, 195 So.2d 590 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
61. 205 So.2d 554 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
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ally claim a substantial benefit from his will, and the practical effect of
his will as executed; he does not possess the requisite capacity.
According to First National Bank v. First Federal Savings and Loan
Association,62 when a donor of a Totten trust becomes incompetent, the
depositor's guardian may not withdraw the corpus unless it is necessary
for the ward's support.
4. UNDUE INFLUENCE
When a beneficiary who occupies a confidential relationship with the
testator is active in the procurement of a will, a presumption of undue
influence arises.63 However, a mere confidential relationship between the
testator and the legatee who offers the will for probate is not sufficient to
raise a presumption of undue influence. 4 Although undue influence need
not be great where the testator is weak and his intellect clouded, the
undue influence may not be inferred solely from the existence of the tes-
tator's condition, 5 nor are kindness and solicitude evidence of undue in-
fluence."' An example of a clear case of undue influence is found in In re
Estate of MacPhee,67 where the beneficiary had the testatrix's power of
attorney, arranged many business transactions for her, and arranged
for the drafting of the will by giving instructions as to its contents.
5. CONTRACTS TO MAKE A WILL
In Sharps v. Sharps"8 the widow and her deceased husband had en-
tered into an antenuptial agreement in which the widow agreed to waive
all other claims or interest except $150,000 from her husband's estate.
The testator's will, however, left her the sum of $250,000. In answer to
the widow's attempt to assert a creditor's claim of $150,000 against the
estate in addition to the bequest, the Third District Court of Appeal de-
cided that the antenuptial agreement was a valid contract to make a will.
The testator simply exceeded his promise with the larger bequest.
An oral contract to make a will was at issue in Hagan v. Laragione0 9
The plaintiff's attorney testified that the wife had raised no objections to
the execution of reciprocal wills, but had taken little part in arranging
for their preparation. The chancellor found that the testatrix had not
known that she was entering into an agreement to dispose of her estate
exactly as set forth, nor that she could not change it without the consent
62. 196 So.2d 211 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
63. See In re Estate of Barfield, 220 So.2d 388 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969) ; In re Estate of Gay,
201 So.2d 807 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967) ; In re Estate of MacPhee, 187 So.2d 679 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1966).
64. In re Estate of Duke, 219 So.2d 124 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
65. In re Estate of Perez, 206 So.2d 58 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
66. In re Estate of Duke, 219 So.2d 124 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
67. 187 So.2d 679 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
68. 219 So.2d 735 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
69. 205 So.2d 289 (Fla. 1967), rev'g Laragione v. Hagan, 195 So.2d 246 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1967).
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of her husband. The Florida Supreme Court sustained the chancellor's
conclusion, stating that the requirement of proof by disinterested wit-
nesses is not an absolute rule but simply indicative of the kind of proof
which would meet the clear and convincing test.
Florida Statutes section 731.051, which provides that contracts to
make a will must be in writing and signed in the presence of two witnesses,
was applied in Langer v. Langer70 to defeat an attempt by the testatrix's
surviving husband to impress a trust in his favor. The stock in issue had
been bequeathed to the testatrix's sisters contrary to an alleged oral
promise by the wife to bequeath it to her sons. Although the surviving
husband had made a gift of the stock to the testatrix in reliance on this
promise, it was unenforceable.
B. Interests Arising out of the Marital Tie
Florida Statutes section 731.101 invalidates a bequest to a spouse
when the parties are divorced subsequent to the execution of a will. In re
Estate of Guess7' interpreted the statute to mean that the remarriage of
the parties does not affect the invalidation. The court then found that the
lapsed residuary clause in favor. of the wife passed by intestacy to the de-
cedent's heirs at law pursuant to Florida Statutes section 731.20(2).
Statutory construction was also the task of the court in In re Estate
of Anders,72 which construed Florida Statutes section 731.35 to mean that
the filing of a claim against an estate, whether by the widow of a testator,
a beneficiary named in the will, or any other person asserting a claim
against the estate, has the effect of tolling the nine months period within
which the widow is required to make her election to take dower. In con-
nection with the election, the court also determined that a widow does not
waive her right to elect against the will by having accepted a partial dis-
tribution of the estate pursuant to the provisions of the will, provided that
her election is timely filed. It was intimated that a different result might
have obtained had the circumstances been prejudicial to the other bene-
ficiaries of the will.
The second district in the case of In re Estate of Pearsons73 found
that the death of an incompetent widow terminates her right to dower just
as it does a competent widow's right. If an incompetent widow dies and
her election through her guardian has not been ruled upon, her election is
null and void since the guardian's power terminates at the ward's death.
A 192 7 statute74 was applied in Brown v. Floyd75 to enforce a parti-
tion action. The court found that according to the prior law, when a head
of a family dies leaving a widow and children, the widow is entitled to
70. 190 So.2d 406 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
71. 213 So.2d 638 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
72. 197 So.2d 837 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
73. 192 So.2d 89 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
74. Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws §§ 4659-61 (1927) [now FLA. STAT. §§ 95.22-.23 (1967)].
75. 202 So.2d 215 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
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dower or a child's part; and, if she fails to elect to take a child's part, she
is confined to dower, which is a life estate only.7" Therefore, the widow's
deed of the land conveyed only her life estate, and the defendant's lands
were impressed with the homestead character. As a result, since the stat-
ute providing that after a lapse of twenty years from record of any deed
or probate of any will purporting to convey lands, no person shall assert
any claim to said lands against claimants under such deed or will77 is not
applicable to homestead lands, the statute could not be asserted as a de-
fense to the action.
C. Insurance Proceeds
The care required in the drafting of bequests of insurance proceeds
is demonstrated by In re Estate of Hunt, 8 where the decedent's will left
the residuary of the estate to his spouse without specific mention of the
insurance policies which named the estate as beneficiary. The surviving
children of the decedent sought to apply Florida Statutes section 222.13,
which provides that if the decedent's will does not effectively bequeath
insurance proceeds, they shall be for the benefit of the spouse and chil-
dren in equal portions. The court concluded that "in order for the will of
a decedent Florida resident to effectively bequeath the proceeds of life
insurance policies which are payable to his estate, it must contain a spe-
cific or general expression which refers to and bequeaths sufficiently and
effectively the insurance or insurance proceeds." 9 In the instant case the
general clause was held to be insufficient.
D. Construction
In the case of In re Estate of Gold,"0 the Third District Court
of Appeal reiterated that a provision for a charitable gift will be construed
liberally and upheld if reasonably susceptible of a construction which
gives it validity.
The reasonableness of the terms of a will was put in issue in the case
of In re Estate of Tobias,8l where the testatrix devised the major portion
of her estate to a school, leaving her only daughter $5,000. The court de-
cided that the unreasonableness of the terms of the will cannot be con-
sidered in determining its validity except in connection with fraud. Since
the evidence established that the will was prepared in accordance with the
wishes of the decedent, it was valid.
A devise is not adeemed when the testator (who became incompetent
after the will's execution) does not need the proceeds of the sale of such
76. Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws § 5484 (1927) [now FLA. STAT. § 731.27 (1967)).
77. Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws § 4659-61 (1927) [now FLA. STAT. §§ 95.22-.23 (1967)].
78. 222 So.2d 272 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
79. Id. at 273.
80. 189 So.2d 905 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
81. 192 So.2d 83 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
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devise for her support and maintenance. The court indicated that the
identity theory need not be followed in a situation where the proceeds of
the sale are a minor portion of the estate.82
Where the decedent, prior to execution of the will, had crossed out
an article with her pen, had written above "omit and cancel," and had
initialed the same in the presence of two witnesses who also affixed their
initials thereto, Florida Statutes section 731.13 was inapplicable. Revo-
cation need not be made by a written instrument since the alterations
were made in the will prior to execution.88
Florida's lapse statute84 received construction in three situations. The
Fourth District Court of Appeal in Davis v. Arkenberg85 decided that
where beneficiaries in a will are referred to by name, the disposition con-
stitutes gifts to individuals and not gifts to a class; and, therefore, the
provisions for the predeceased beneficiaries lapse. The Second District
Court of Appeal in In re Estate of Walker" found that where a residuary
gift lapses due to the nonexistence of the beneficiary, the lapsed portion
goes to the remaining residuary beneficiary. The Third District Court of
Appeal in In re Estate of Levy 7 concluded that where the testator leaves
his entire estate to six beneficiaries, three of whom predeceased the tes-
tator, and specifically makes no provision for his sole heir, the legacies
of the predeceased beneficiaries lapse. The lapsed legacies become a part
of the residuum which pass by intestacy to the sole heir. "In order to cut
off an heir's right to succession a testator must do more than merely
evince an intention that the heir shall not share in the estate-he must
make a valid disposition of his property."88
An executrix who receives by will the power to dispose of property
without the order or confirmation of the court may validly exercise such
power when "it is necessary for purpose of administration that assets of
the estate be liquidated. . . . But where it is not necessary to make such
liquidation in order to administer the estate, even under a general power
of sale, the Probate Court should sanction the sale."89 In such a case
Florida Statutes section 733.23, concerning sales where no power is con-
ferred, would apply.
According to Florida Statutes section 734.041 (a) and 734.06, the
burden of estate taxes and costs of administration exceeding the residuary
estate falls first upon general legatees; the burden is not apportionable
among general and specific legatees alike.9
82. Forbes v. Burket, 181 So.2d 682 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
83. In re Estate of Golden, 211 So.2d 234 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
84. FLA. STAT. § 731.20 (1967).
85. 195 So.2d 46 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
86. 204 So.2d 44 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
87. 196 So.2d 225 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
88. Id. at 229.
89. In re Estate of Smith, 200 So.2d 547, 554 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
90. In re Estate of George, 200 So.2d 256 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
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E. Will Contests and Other Proceedings
An agreement not to contest which is supported by sufficient con-
sideration can be recognized by the county judge without a trial and
evidentiary hearing if only its legal effect is in issue. 1
The issue of whether an administrator ad litem appointed sua sponte
by the county court has the right to appeal the probate of the will after the
county judge has discharged such administrator ad litem was considered
by the Florida Supreme Court in In re Estate of Herlan . 2 The court
found that the probate of a will would not preclude the ultimate com-
pletion of investigative proceedings by appropriate appellate review.
Rule 5.090(c) of the Probate and Guardianship Rules provides that
the proponent of a will in due form shall receive his costs and attorney
fees out of the estate even though he is unsuccessful. According to In re
Estate of MacPhee,11 however, the judge has the discretion to decide
whether the executor was justified in offering the will for probate; "and
in exercising such discretion, to observe the following precepts: (1) that
the executor or proponent acted in good faith, (2) that his conduct was
free from fraud, (3) that the litigation benefited the estate, and (4) if
the attorney fees were payable on a contingent basis, such contingency
materialized." 4 The court reached its conclusion by applying section
732.14 of the Florida Statutes (which provides that costs may be awarded
in the discretion of the county judge) to the above-mentioned rule.
In order to invoke the limitation provision for revocation of probate
under section 732.28 of the Florida Statutes actual compliance must be
observed. Any failure to comply strictly with the statute is fatal to the
election under the procedure, which may result in a contest just prior to
the discharge of the personal representatives."'
F. Jurisdictional Problems
"The circuit court has jurisdiction to construe the provisions of a
will so long as the will has first been probated and the circuit court was
the court first obtaining jurisdiction for construction. "96 The circuit court
also has sole jurisdiction over the validity and administration of trusts.9 7
Thus, where the county judge ordered the guardian of a Totten trust to
transfer the fund to the estate on the theory that the decedent's will re-
voked the trust, the appellate court found that the county judge lacked
jurisdiction to enter such an order. "A county judge has no power to
91. In re Estate of Garvey, 196 So.2d 36 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
92. 209 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1968), rev'g In re Estate of Herlan, 191 So.2d 276 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1966).
93. 216 So.2d 489 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
94. Id. at 491. See In re Estate of Reid, 182 So.2d 54 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
95. In re Estate of Dalton, 206 So.2d 264 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
96. First Nat'l Bank v. Risolia, 200 So.2d 260 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
97. See In re Estate of Young, 199 So.2d 115 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967) ; Robinson v. Horne,
192 So.2d 332 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
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determine ownership of personal property as between an estate and a
stranger thereto." '
The county court has jurisdiction to confirm and effectuate agree-
ments not to contest a will. 9
Since section 732.06 of the Florida Statutes fixes venue for probate
in the county of the decedent's domicile, the action of a county judge's
court in one county to probate an estate of a decedent, concededly in
another county at the time of his death, is an unlawful exercise of juris-
diction.10 In order to protect the rights of creditors and distributees, a
probate proceeding is not susceptible to waiver of the venue established
by law.
The county judge has jurisdiction to assess attorney's fees against
a distributee's share of an estate, but, where the services of the attorneys
are performed primarily in the establishment of the testamentary trust,
the fees are correctly assessed against the corpus of the trust.''
The circuit court does not have jurisdiction to seal a file of pro-
ceedings in the probate court.'02
G. Personal Liability of the Beneficiary
Under Florida law title to real estate passes at the death of the de-
visee, subject only to the right of the executor to sell for certain reasons.
Therefore, when a devisee refuses to accept distribution, the court has
the authority to charge preservation costs against the devisee.''
98. In re Estate of Young, 199 So.2d 115, 116 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
99. In re Estate of Garvey, 196 So.2d 36 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
100. State ex rel. McGreevy v. Dowling, 223 So.2d 89 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
101. In re Estate of Gerhart, 220 So.2d 655 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
102. In re Trust under Robinson's Will, 197 So.2d 826 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
103. In re Estate of Pearsons, 190 So.2d 593 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
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